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<username>{{ maskedUsername }}</username><space /><text>just voted for</text><space /><projectLogo /><space /><projectName>{{ projectName }}</projectName>

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Description of vulnerability and your proof of concept or validation steps

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Vulnerability Title

Duplicate Check on Payload Index

Direct Field Editing Outside Setter Method

Direct Field Read Outside Getter Method

Redundant Field Usage

Unnecessary Check on Local Maximum Epoch End Overflow

Misleading Method Name

No Check after Bootstrapping is done

Customize the parameters of Error CriticalDataStreamTimeout

Lack of Error Handling While Writing to DB

No Error Notification on Early Exit

Excessive if-else Statements to Customize Error Output

Aptos Core - State Sync

Cargo.toml

bootstrapper.rs

continuous_syncer.rs

driver.rs

driver_client.rs

driver_factory.rs

error.rs

lib.rs

logging.rs

metrics.rs

notification_handlers.rs

storage_synchronizer.rs

utils.rs

Invalid Transaction Size Calculation

Possible For Ready Transactions To Be Skipped

Data Inconsistency on `metrics_cache`

Possible To Prevent All Broadcasts to a Peer

 Potential Invalid Usage of the `write_lock`

Missing Error Handling for Validation Result

Parking Transactions During Garbage Collection

Improper Handling of Option In `checked_add` Function

Aptoslabs Core - Mempool

index.rs

mempool.rs

mod.rs

transaction.rs

transaction_store.rs

ttl_cache.rs

coordinator.rs

network.rs

runtime.rs

tasks.rs

types.rs

common.rs

core_mempool_test.rs

fuzzing.rs

integration_tests.rs

mocks.rs

multi_node_test.rs

node.rs

shared_mempool_test.rs

test_framework.rs

counters.rs

thread_pool.rs

Function decoupling can lead to inconsistency

Repeated check on unchanged condition

PeerManager accepts any number of Inbound connections with O(Existing active peers) computation

Unrecoverable connection to peer on outbound message error

Usage of Magic Number for channel size

 AptosNet Dns names can be subject to utf-8 phishing attacks

Incorrect documentation in inbound connection upgrade

Unbuffered frame length in Noise stream

Missing `else` Branch in TcpTransport::connect_via_proxy

Aptos Core - Network

test.rs

constants.rs

interface.rs

storage.rs

builder.rs

handshake.rs

stream.rs

conn_notifs_channel.rs

senders.rs

transport.rs

identity.rs

messaging.rs

memory_listener.rs

memory_socket.rs

and_then.rs

boxed.rs

memory.rs

proxy_protocol.rs

tcp.rs

framing.rs

dummy.rs

Execution of Existing Block Does Not Check Parent Block

Lack of Input Validation

Aptoslabs Core - Execution

db-bootstrapper.rs

executor_benchmark.rs

account_generator.rs

db_generator.rs

main.rs

pipeline.rs

transaction_committer.rs

transaction_executor.rs

transaction_generator.rs

executed_chunk.rs

in_memory_state_calculator.rs

parsed_transaction_output.rs

README.md

block_executor.rs

chunk_executor.rs

db_bootstrapper.rs

apply_chunk_output.rs

chunk_commit_queue.rs

chunk_output.rs

Optimization on the `try_commit()` Function 

Risk of Weak Randomness in Proposer Elections

Lack of Validation on `enable_cached_safety_data`

Lack of Error Message

Missing Check for `consensus_data_hash` Field in LedgerInfo

Aggregation Result of Timeout Votes Can Be Manipulated

Missing Check for `self.highest_comit_cert().commit_info().epoch()`

Aptoslabs Core - Consensus

commit_decision.rs

commit_vote.rs

block.rs

block_data.rs

block_retrieval.rs

epoch_retrieval.rs

executed_block.rs

proposal_msg.rs

quorum_cert.rs

request_response.rs

safety_data.rs

sync_info.rs

timeout_2chain.rs

vote.rs

vote_data.rs

vote_msg.rs

vote_proposal.rs

consensus_state.rs

local_client.rs

persistent_safety_storage.rs

process.rs

remote_service.rs

safety_rules.rs

safety_rules_2chain.rs

safety_rules_manager.rs

serializer.rs

t_safety_rules.rs

thread.rs

commit_notifier.rs

consensus_provider.rs

epoch_manager.rs

metrics_safety_rules.rs

network_interface.rs

payload_manager.rs

pending_votes.rs

persistent_liveness_storage.rs

round_manager.rs

state_computer.rs

state_replication.rs

txn_notifier.rs

block_store.rs

block_tree.rs

sync_manager.rs

tracing.rs

buffer.rs

buffer_item.rs

buffer_manager.rs

decoupled_execution_utils.rs

errors.rs

execution_phase.rs

hashable.rs

linkedlist.rs

ordering_state_computer.rs

persisting_phase.rs

pipeline_phase.rs

signing_phase.rs

cached_proposer_election.rs

leader_reputation.rs

proposal_generator.rs

proposer_election.rs

rotating_proposer_election.rs

round_proposer_election.rs

round_state.rs

unequivocal_proposer_election.rs

direct_mempool_quorum_store.rs

time_service.rs

round_manager_fuzzing.rs

load_signature_token introduces inconsistency during deserialization

ReferenceSafetyChecker panics when validating malformed modules, enabling remote DoS attacks to Aptos Nodes

Incorrect return value in verify_module_init_function

Type safety verifier failure in VecPack, enabling resource fabrication.

move-bytecode-verifier: missing checks for unused signatures

Aptos Core - Move Deps

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